There is something peculiar and especially intriguing about notions like ‘self’, ‘subjectivity’ and ‘person’. These notions seem to have a particular importance, not only because of their impact on ethics, law, politics, and on philosophy in general, but also because somehow they concern me.
Even if there is, and from ancient times has been, a profound discussion about these notions trying to capture the sense of what is means to be a self or a person, it is undeniably only I who can know this.
When we are to engage in a discussion about notions like self and person, we must therefore be aware of a quite perplexing fact, namely that when we are to explain what a self is, it is the subjective that is supposed to be the objective. The object that accordingly is to be described is the self and if this description is to contain any sense of truth it must be applicable to my own subjective point of view.
Surely we can question our own privileged access to ourselves and the discussion about how self-awareness at all is possible is an important and crucial one. Yet, me must nevertheless somehow keep in mind that the only viable criterion accessible, for what it means to be a self, is subjective, insofar as the object that is to be denominated with the word ‘myself’ still is supposed to be me.